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Editor’s Note: This article is the second in a two-
part series. Part One may be found in the Summer 
2006 issue.
To continue this investigation into the na-ture of our enemy in the War on Terror, my premise, again, is this: Westerniza-
tion is an endemic threat to any group wishing 
to retain its non-Western and often pre-modern 
corporate identity. This threat produces reac-
tions shaped by demography (un- or under-
employed adolescent males), by factionalism, 
by political circumstances and by the cultural 
predicates of religious belief. These demograph-
ic, social, political and cultural factors are often 
varyingly mistaken as causes of islamist violence 
when, more properly, they should be called en-
ablers. What has caused our islamist enemies to 
be what they are erupts from factional divides 
we exacerbate when we push individual rights 
and freedoms, live as though we privilege the 
material over the spiritual, and universalize our 
notions of equality.
i have suggested that important policy im-
plications flow from the divides Westernization 
engenders between those who wish to preserve 
their corporate identity (i refer to them as “nativ-
ists”) and accommodationists, who, along with 
us, imperil that corporate identity. These policy 
implications fall into three broad categories. 
First, while not all forms of anti-Westernism 
produce violence, islamist nativism does and 
will continue to do so. nor will methods used to 
successfully limit earlier forms of nativist, anti-
Western violence work against islamists. islam, 
a world religion, introduces new wrinkles into 
what was often “just” a localized, tribal problem 
in the past. This means that the War on Terror 
could well be a long war—although not for the 
reasons the Bush Administration has espoused. 
it will be long not because the democratic re-
forms necessary to transform the middle East 
will be, in the President’s words, “the work of 
generations.” Rather, it will be long because 
nativists will ensure that to increasing numbers 
of muslims the identity and existence of islam 
itself will seem to hang in the balance.
second, contrary to much common asser-
tion, islamists view the struggle as a religious 
conflict, not an ideological one. The contention 
that islamism is a wholly modern ideology di-
vorced from the sacred, having little to do with 
islam as a religion, is wishful thinking. While 
islamists have borrowed liberally from West-
ern, marxist and other ideologies, that does not 
mean that islamism is essentially an ideology, or 
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that it is mostly borrowed. At its core there is a 
religious and divinely mandated template as old 
as the Quran itself. 
Third, the strategy that posits that the key 
to success in battling islamist violence is to 
appeal to and separate moderates in muslim 
countries from so-called radicals is a chimera. 
it presupposes the erection of political firewalls, 
as if these can keep co-religionists apart, or as 
if it’s possible to prevent moderates from being 
radicalized by unforeseen events. This presumes 
that we can identify who among our own pop-
ulation might go postal, who might shoot up a 
high school, or who might react to an incident 
like Waco as Timothy mcVeigh did. Clearly, 
we can’t accurately identify or predict radicals 
here at home. What makes us think we can do 
any better abroad?
But even if winning over muslim moderates 
were the key to defusing this “long war”, a U.s. 
values offensive—our advocacy of democracy, 
gender equality, “human rights” and religious 
freedom as defined in the West—is the worst 
possible way to proceed. Given the dynamics 
of factionalism and nativism, any focus on val-
ues hands nativists exactly what they need: By 
condemning their choices, we make traditional 
practices, and whatever religious precepts are 
thought to undergird them, the issue. it is hard 
to think of a policy concept that is more mis-
guided or inimical to our interests.
Sources of the Long War
We need to be clear: Being anti-Western or even anti-modern need not presuppose 
anti-Western violence. Also, modernization is 
not completely synonymous with Westerniza-
tion, so rejecting the former need not entail re-
jecting the latter: The Amish, for instance, are 
in many ways anti-modern, but they are hardly 
anti-Western. Almost all nomadic pastoralists 
(people who keep livestock)—maasai in East 
Africa, Fulani and Tuareg in the sahel, Bedouin 
throughout the middle East, and many soma-
lis—can likewise be considered anti-modern: 
They reject permanent settlement. nor does 
much of what modernity has to offer accord 
well with their peripatetic life. But so long as 
they can reject what they don’t need, and can 
remain culturally autonomous and nomadic, 
there is no reason for pastoral nomads to adopt 
a violently anti-modern let alone anti-Western 
stance.
many American indian tribes, too—navajo, 
Lakota and most Pueblos—contain significant 
traditionalist, nativist and anti-assimilationist 
factions whose aim is to remain as spiritually 
indian as possible. Because traditionalist indi-
ans reject Christianity, we could say this makes 
them anti-Western (and not just anti-modern) 
by default, but they are not actively anti-West-
ern. Rather, thanks to reservations and the 
space these offer, the U.s. government no lon-
ger needs to force indians to assimilate, and so 
traditionalist indians have no current reason to 
wage war against the United states. 
We would do well to distinguish between 
anti-modern traditionalists who have inherited 
their way of life, however, and those who choose 
to reject the modern world in which they were 
raised. As to the former, nothing about their re-
jection of modernity requires them to take up 
arms. Typically, they are not interested in pros-
elytizing; they just want to be left alone. The 
lesson this suggests is that if only we grant anti-
modern traditionalists space, autonomy and the 
freedom to operate communally, they pose no 
threat. in contrast, those who choose to reject 
the world in which they were raised—like the 
Unabomber, Ted Kaczynski, for example—do 
pose a problem. This is the problem olivier Roy 
and others have identified when they home in 
on young, de-communalized but not de-raci-
nated muslims in Europe. These are youth who 
want what modernity has to offer yet grow in-
creasingly anti-Western in the process. 
Again, peoples and factions in such cir-
cumstances need not turn violent. Take, for 
example, most self-segregated muslim commu-
nities outside the middle East prior to the ira-
nian Revolution, or most ultra-orthodox Jew-
ish communities everywhere to this day. The 
latter are religious but usually not politically 
mobilized. Having removed or isolated them-
selves physically from the larger society, and by 
purposely and carefully forgoing lots of things 
(even if not everything), they can assiduously 
avoid or control threats to their communal 
identity. Push a bit further, and what becomes 
apparent is that most such enclaves have fig-
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ured out how to subsist “within us but without 
us”, which means they have reached an accom-
modation. so long as group members believe 
they can remain true to their traditions, they 
are unlikely to want to draw attention to them-
selves, let alone cause problems for us. in other 
words, with sufficient social distance, mutual 
tolerance—even if not mutual respect—may 
well be possible, but probably only when people 
are willing to remain marginal, subordinate 
and apolitical.
By contrast, people who cannot or do not 
wish to remain marginal, who cannot or do 
not wish to subsist without modern, Western 
amenities, yet who actively disparage and rail 
against Western values, make much less sense 
to us. This describes most islamists and all ji-
hadists, whether they live in the middle East, 
Europe or north America. How can they take 
so much of what the West produces, be so de-
pendent, and yet still act so hostile and aggres-
sively anti-Western? To us this reeks of hypoc-
risy or ingratitude, or both. no doubt this is 
one reason we assume that, in despising us, is-
lamists really despise themselves; how can they 
not when they’re so technologically incapable 
and inferior?
The catch is that these are our readings of 
their motivations. We forget that as Americans 
we tend to measure worth according to tech-
nological prowess and individual freedoms. 
Without these characteristics we could not have 
generated our present wealth or well-being. nor 
would we be able to keep growing, changing 
and generating more opportunities—the hall-
marks of both democracy and capitalism. But 
embedded in this measure of worth is a self-re-
inforcing logic that may be more peculiar to us 
than we suppose: We privilege technology and 
opportunity because they have privileged us, 
and so we consider them to be the measures of 
success and superiority for everyone. in short, 
we are still quite Calvinist, and we take the fact 
that nearly everyone wants so much of what we 
produce and consume as further proof that our 
standards are universal. 
However, the French (just to pick on 
them—why not?) would hardly agree. Accord-
ing to their sensibilities, they set the standard 
to which all should aspire: superior High Cul-
ture. not only do the French know how to live 
well, but by the criteria of style, art and cuisine 
they reign supreme. of course, italians might 
beg to differ, while swedes and norwegians 
would doubtless argue that, in terms of health 
and social well-being, they actually live best. 
The point is that different peoples judge not 
only their own worth, but also that of others, 
according to standards that tend to reflect what 
they value most.
such standards vary according to how, 
or even if, they can be measured. it is easy, 
for instance, to claim technological superior-
ity. That is measurable not only in numbers 
of patents, but in engineering feats, miracles 
of modern medicine or through contests of 
arms. Claims to superiority based on style or 
high culture are harder to prove, though who 
people emulate and what they buy may be con-
sidered sufficiently convincing demonstrations 
of worth. But what about moral superiority? 
When it comes to moral worth, what could 
possibly count as an agreed-upon measure for 
peoples who adhere to different moral codes? 
For those who are religious, for instance, the 
only real proofs of moral rectitude come with 
divine judgment. And while different peoples 
might view natural disasters such as tsunamis, 
earthquakes or floods as testaments, are these 
warnings or punishments? Even that cannot be 
answered with certainty.
What this in turn means is that for those 
who use morality as the yardstick by which 
to measure societal superiority, we can never 
prove ourselves superior, or even equal, unless 
we adopt their standards. This is what we are up 
against not only with islamists, but potentially 
all muslims who hold their faith dear. mus-
lims’ measure of their worth has everything to 
do with islam’s moral superiority. A poor peas-
ant who lives in a mud hut will consider himself 
superior to us, and there is nothing any infor-
mation campaign or “war of ideas” strategy can 
do to persuade him otherwise.
We privilege technology 
and opportunity because 
they have privileged us.
38 the	AmericAn	intereSt
RELIGION & POLITICS
This explains more about our current pre-
dicament than most policymakers want to 
recognize. For instance, muslims’ convictions 
about their God-given superiority justify their 
making a whole range of separations that we do 
not. To take just one example, men and women 
are not the same and therefore should not be 
treated the same. That’s not just an ideological 
but a moral stance. Another example: The con-
nections we make between our values and our 
productivity mean nothing to people who don’t 
believe material well-being and moral worth are 
causally related. Far more compelling, instead, 
is the notion that moral superiors deserve what-
ever moral inferiors are clever enough to design 
and build. if we are those moral inferiors—and 
we are in many muslims’ eyes—then there 
can’t be anything hypocritical about using what 
we produce.
We err deeply when we assume that we can 
seduce people into adopting our values by get-
ting them to adopt our stuff. There is virtually 
no evidence that this works in the non-Chris-
tian, non-West; if it did, there would no longer 
be a non-Christian, non-West. Consider all the 
Western goods that fill markets and houses in 
the middle East and beyond. This should be 
an indicator that we only fool ourselves when 
we assume muslims resent us because of our 
productivity and material success, and don’t 
instead resent us for our lack of moral worth—
worth we lack because we refuse to recognize 
islam as the superior faith. 
muslims’ commitment to their own superi-
ority should not surprise us, for in case after case 
those who have fought Westernization have done 
so not just because they do not want to change, 
but because they consider their way of life, their 
beliefs and their morals to be both superior and 
at risk. nobody rallied more American indians 
to stand firm against whites than Tecumseh, 
a shawnee, of whom it has been said that the 
“constant, crucial ambition of shawnee was to 
remain shawnee, which they were unshakably 
convinced was much better than being anyone 
else.”1 Clearly, this was not true for all shawnee, 
since some willingly assimilated, but it is what 
drove Tecumseh to fight to the death. The same 
was the case for legions of other indian leaders: 
Better to fight and die as an indian than to sur-
render and become something else.
submission is the critical concept here. How 
can a group of people sure of their moral supe-
riority ever submit to anyone else’s moral code? 
(Civil authority yes, but only if it does not con-
tradict religious precepts; not coincidentally, 
that is exactly what muslim law obligates.) This 
issue of submission and moral superiority repre-
sents the crux of the struggle between islamists 
and the West, which, tellingly, islamists assert 
without reservation but which no Westerner 
in a position of power dares mention. For that 
would make this war essentially a religious war, 
which it mustn’t be—but which in fact it is.
The historical logic that emerges from earli-er cases of anti-Western nativism suggests 
that if only we could grant muslims sufficient 
space and autonomy to live communally and ac-
cording to their own moral precepts, we could 
take the violent sting out of their opposition. 
But if we use history as a guide, we would also 
have to first either subdue and then sequester 
them, or let them go off and be anti-Western in 
some resourceless hinterland somewhere. Alter-
natively, we might try to forcibly Westernize all 
muslims, obliterate them, or tolerate al-Qaeda-
like attacks in perpetuity. But given that most 
1Bil Gilbert, God Gave Us This Country: Teka-
mthi and the First American Civil War (Anchor 
Books, 1990), p. 51.
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of these options are demographically or logisti-
cally impossible, and the last is, or ought to be, 
unacceptable, we face a real dilemma: History 
suggests no arena in which a struggle such as 
the present one can be peaceably worked out or 
ended quickly.
Compounding our difficulties is the fact that 
overwhelming conventional military strength 
such as ours invites unconventional responses 
from clever enemies. The corollary is that when 
people fight a war to defend their identity or 
their corporate right to exist, they almost always 
end up “fighting dirty.” Those who fight to se-
cure, establish or improve their reputation or 
standing usually do not. Thus, what lies behind 
the asymmetry of the present war is what should 
most arrest our attention. That we are currently 
on the receiving end of a war that deliberately 
seeks the mass murder of civilians should tell us 
that our islamist adversaries believe their iden-
tity and existence, not just their reputation, are 
at stake. This, too, has critical implications for 
how long the War on Terror will last, and for 
how far our adversaries will go to prosecute it. 
There are plenty of examples from the last 
two centuries that show us how groups fighting 
for their identity and existence behave. Typi-
cally, nativists believe their spiritual power—or 
strength of will—can overcome Western tech-
nology, even when they themselves make use of 
Western weapons. For instance, the Japanese in 
World War ii were firmly convinced that their 
superior will, coupled with advanced technol-
ogy, would allow them to beat us. When we 
won instead they recognized that they had ap-
plied their superior will to the wrong means 
(that is, they should not have fought us militar-
ily). Under the Emperor’s command, they then 
shifted en masse from pursuing anti-Western 
goals militarily to, some might argue, pursuing 
them economically. Up to the 1980s they even 
seemed poised to succeed.
in contrast, islamists represent some of what 
made the Japanese so formidable: strength of 
will married to selected advanced technology. 
But islamists cannot retool as the Japanese did 
after World War ii. There is no emperor (or 
caliph) who can command all islamists, let 
alone urge jihadists to change tack. Also, islam 
generates bountiful nativism. The call to pu-
rify the religion and expunge corrupting influ-
ences, as well as a demand for obeisance or, at 
the very least, respect from infidels, is built-in. 
it has been since the 7th century. What is new 
today is that Westernization is the target. For 
most of our mutual history Westerners encoun-
tered muslim armies, the vanguard of muslim 
societies, but not muslim communities per se. 
With Western imperial thrusts, however, social 
distance, which began to erode in the 19th cen-
tury and was sharply curtailed in the 20th, has 
virtually disappeared now in the 21st. not only 
have we come to represent the most prominent 
“other” confronting islam, but we seem to be 
everywhere they are. 
Religion and Ideology
Religions can either exclude or include, can divide or unify otherwise disparate 
peoples. Part of islam’s appeal is its inclusiv-
ity. islam is not confined to a single tribe, race 
or ethnicity. it also offers a recipe for action to 
its adherents. The Quran and Hadith serve as 
templates for replicating muhammad’s success, 
joining people together across lineages, tribes 
and all sorts of boundaries that otherwise still 
fracture the non-West. Even better, scripture in 
the case of islam serves as script: muhammad 
formed the ultimate secret society and with it 
waged a series of triumphant, even miraculous 





successful history with a cyclical view of his-
tory, and it should be clear how hope ends up 
fused to purpose.
This makes the re-ascendance of islam 
eminently attractive to youth in particular. But 
the package is even neater than this because, 
in addition to containing within itself a revo-
lutionary or reformist impulse, islam, through 
muhammad’s example, formats how reform 
or revolution are to be accomplished—and 
promises Allah’s assistance given a sufficiently 
righteous cause. This is yet another reason this 
religion represents a particular challenge; it has 
been fought for before and persists, thanks to 
the dogged determination of the faithful. Con-
sider the fate of the soviets in Afghanistan. ig-
nore stinger missiles and focus on fervor: That’s 
what earned the mujaheddin those stingers in 
the first place.
Faith brings us to the heart of the matter 
and to a key set of differences between religion 
and ideology. Though ideology has at times 
seemed to approach religion as a motivating 
factor, it has never equaled it. The most obvi-
ous distinction between the two involves divin-
ity and the afterlife. Those who believe in God 
typically believe in divine judgment. if God 
is believed to have sanctioned a certain war 
and certain behaviors, there are no limits to 
what some men will then do. Whether religion 
engenders a greater will to win in individuals 
than -isms (like nationalism or communism) 
is debatable, but for sheer numbers of people 
whom it can galvanize and inspire, religion is 
hard to beat. That is because, already repre-
senting a coherent set of rituals, behaviors and 
beliefs, religion offers a ready-made supply of 
organizable worshippers and a means for mo-
bilizing them. it also offers the ultimate grand 
strategy (“We are following God’s plan”) and 
rules that already feel familiar to adherents. 
For most people, members of communal 
societies especially, religion is primordial: in-
dividuals are born simultaneously into religion 
and family. With family and religion inter-
twined from the outset, an individual’s person-
al faith can wax and wane over time. no deci-
sion need be made regarding how much or how 
little to belong. Family members rarely ques-
tion the depth of each other’s religious feelings 
(which is yet another reason suicide terrorism 
is so stealthy—individual fervor is easy to bury 
in practices family members simply associate 
with being muslim). But also, because religion 
is embedded within family, the most normal 
and natural organization of human life, faith 
doesn’t seem or feel invented—especially not 
when it dovetails with belonging to something 
greater than oneself, which is what extended 
family represents at the lowest end of the scale, 
the community of believers at the broadest.
What then could possibly trump religion? 
nothing—or nothing we know thus far. There 
is no discernible ideological mass movement or 
-ism (apart from, perhaps, future manifestations 
of environmentalism) that can inspire so many 
segments of so many populations. nationalism, 
an equally potent force in terms of its primor-
dial tugs (since one is born into a “nation” when 
one is born into a family), is by definition much 
more exclusive. it’s also secular. indeed, even if 
something were to develop with mass appeal 
and a unifying message, it is hard to imagine 
how it could supersede faith in an omnipotent, 
omniscient power. This is the source of religion’s 
ultimate survivability: its claim that whatever 
it cannot explain cannot be understood. That 
makes it undisprovable, and it is virtually impos-
sible to convince people that they are wrong (or 
misguided) regarding anything undisprovable. 
For instance, someone who scoffs at the exis-
tence of Bigfoot or aliens, and who can readily 
discount all the evidence that believers muster, 
can be “converted” overnight should Bigfoot or 
aliens suddenly make contact. However, what 
evidence can skeptics offer to believers to make 
them doubt? Take the existence of God itself: a 
lack of empirical evidence is irrelevant for those 
who believe God owes us no proofs. And though 
some people will shed their faith after a cata-
strophic event, others will understand tragedy as 
a test—especially if severe tests of faith occurred 
in the past, and particularly if they are described 
in scripture itself.
Ideology has never equaled 
religion as a motivating 
factor for believers.
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not so with ideology. By definition ideology 
is secular, and each ideology that comes along 
promises answers for all human problems. no 
religion dares go that far. As a consequence, 
while numerous ideologies have proven capable 
of replacing religion in the minds and hearts 
of some, coercion has been required to instill 
respect for ideology in the minds of all. it can-
not be a coincidence that secularist totalitarian 
systems perfect surveillance and compulsion. 
Unlike religions, ideologies require inculcation 
individual by individual. Whatever solidarity 
they foster has to be consciously and continu-
ally re-created. Thus, ideological bonds cannot 
in any sense be considered primordial, not even 
by their fiercest advocates.
nor are ideologies particularly flexible, prob-
ably because they are not organic. They are in-
tellectually engineered and artificially, even in-
geniously, designed to be imposed from the top 
down. They neither revolve around nor evolve 
from a core set of rituals, habits or customs. The 
beauty of these at the heart of religion is that so 
long as some practices remain consistently the 
same, others can be permitted to change over 
time such that the overall shifts feel natural and 
unforced. nor is it a coincidence that religions 
become most resilient when adherents have rea-
son to worry about their fate and thus the after-
life; this renders believers all the more responsive. 
That’s not a dynamic we find in ideologies. 
Boil down the differences between religion and ideology and we see that we Americans 
would do better fighting against an ideology on 
behalf of a religion. in the minds of many this is 
how we won the Cold War—we believed in God 
and the enemy did not. That cannot be said of 
our current enemies who, for a host of reasons, 
we nonetheless want to believe are motivated by 
ideology. Why? The short answer is because we 
believe we are, and we desperately seek a sym-
metrical struggle. 
During the Cold War we competed against 
the soviets over the same things in a wide range 
of arenas: sports, space, underwater technology, 
food production and so forth. Because we were 
each striving to prove whose political economy 
or system was better, the soviets could not 
overtly use our technology (not that they didn’t 
steal blueprints and plans whenever they could). 
The rivalry was instead played out in terms 
of who could out-invent and out-produce the 
enemy. Along practically every dimension the 
contest came down to tangibles, and all sides, 
even neutrals, agreed on these standards. 
We could even go so far as to say that minds 
were our targets in the soviet Union and the 
Eastern Bloc, and cognitive dissonance provid-
ed the ideal lever to move them our way: The 
shoddier their goods relative to ours, the more 
bankrupt their system appeared. But no such 
reciprocities exist in this current struggle. is-
lamists are not islamists by virtue of cognition. 
nor are muslims compelled by force to keep 
the faith. in the case of islam (or any religion) 
it is virtue, not technical prowess, that matters, 
and souls, not minds, are the key.
it is hard to miss the deeper irony here. Al-
though we as Americans believe that by sharing 
a democracy we share an ideology (at most, a 
desacralized civil religion), the context for our 
form of democracy has always been religious—
Protestantism, to be specific.2 We privilege the 
ideological components of our faith (little “f”) 
over the religious components because all forms 
of Protestantism are not the same and not all 
Americans are Protestants. The upside of this 
is that we are predisposed to treat all religions 
equally. The downside is that it makes us sus-
ceptible to viewing everything in ideological 
terms. We are downright voluble about wanting 
to see our morals—gender equity, the protec-
tion of individual rights and so forth—adopted 
abroad. And because we couch these values in 
universal ideological terms, not more parochial 
Christian (or Judeo-Christian) religious ones, 
we believe others should view them that way, 
too. But they don’t.
All this is of a piece with our Enlightenment 
conviction that ideas are liberating. The prob-
lem with this notion is that we then mistakenly 
assume that others oppose us for the ideas we 
disseminate, not recognizing that ideas on their 
own cannot contaminate non-Western societ-
ies; ideas need people as agents, and practices 
as proof. These agents contaminate; so these—
meaning us—are what nativists believe need to 
2see James Kurth, “George Bush and the Prot-




be wiped out, our practices along with us.
of course, the Bush Administration has 
gone out of its way to reaffirm that the War on 
Terror is not an attack on islam. on its face, 
such a demurral suggests that we recognize the 
gravity of “religicizing” the war—as does the 
other side, which has not attacked Christianity 
as such. But if so, this implies a sort of reciproc-
ity of legitimacy that neither side would agree 
exists. To “them”, we advocate a misguided lib-
eral ideology that seeks to unseat islam’s role in 
a muslim world. To us, they represent an ideo-
logically extreme version of an otherwise com-
patible faith. in other words, when muslims 
look at us, they see a religion pretending to be 
an ideology. When we look at islamists, we see 
an ideology pretending to be a religion.
Moderates, Imperialists & Crusaders
While it may be inevitable that we Amer-icans view islam through an ideologi-
cal prism, and that muslims view us through 
a religious one, neither perception is quite 
right. But put them together and it is clear: 
Liberal ideology is no more separable from 
its Protestant religious heritage than islam is 
fully compatible with individuation or other 
Western values. Yet so long as this mutual mis-
apprehension exists, it does grant us a small 
window of opportunity. We might yet have 
time to shift the conflict away from a contest 
that forces muslims to choose how much or 
how little to demonstrate their commitment to 
Faith (capital “F”), though to do so we must 
stop trying to woo moderates in order to iso-
late radicals. 
Because we are still at an early stage in this 
long war, neither “side” is as yet fully-formed. 
There are struggles within the West as well as 
among muslims over what has transpired thus 
far, and what should occur in the future. At the 
same time, muslim moderates appear to be up 
for grabs, and everyone is trying to grab them. 
it’s as if they represent the solution or, at the very 
least, a stopgap. But how so? While moderates 
may vote, they cannot seize attention, let alone 
galvanize youth or sway public opinion, unless 
they are willing to speak or act with as much 
passion as partisans—and by definition they 
don’t. Likewise, moderates are never ruthless 
enough to defeat those bent on using violence 
to cleanse and purify. Thus, it is wholly unre-
alistic to assume that we can inspire moderate 
muslims to take up cudgels in our defense. 
Worse, in the long history of islam, “cleans-
ers” have usually prevailed. How can they not, 
when they thrive on hardship, asceticism, the 
romance of self-sacrifice and total dedication to 
a righteous cause?
Another reason that banking on moderates 
is a mistake takes us back to factionalization. 
Again, our doing anything (or even openly 
desiring it) becomes the means by which we 
not only guarantee that accommodationists 
(our allies) will have nativists to contend with 
in perpetuity, but by defining “radical” islam 
as an ideology, we enable nativists to make far 
more of it as a religion. saying anything about 
islam just reaffirms suspicions about our inten-
tions and stokes speculation—speculation we 
then can’t control—about what we are really up 
to. if not conversion or eradication, then what? 
How can our expressed hopes for islamic “re-
form” not amount to distortion or a contraven-
tion of the true faith?
if it seems that we’re hoisted on a virtually 
impossible petard, that could be because we 
are. We can’t target the basic social and political 
values of the vast majority of muslims without 
challenging islam, which suffuses their way of 
life. But do this and we might as well embark 
on a full-blown, old-fashioned crusade. Trying 
to promote any major social change, even—or 
maybe especially—when couched as libera-
tion or a “freedom agenda”, is likewise fraught. 
First, no matter how many muslims tell us they 
want to be free, pushing our notions of free-
dom (and democracy) implies that theirs are 
no good. Here we’re back to lauding our values 
and denigrating theirs. or to cut to the chase 
from a different angle, devout, practicing, be-
lieving muslims cannot adopt our moral values 
and still remain muslim. Besides, for those who 
believe that islam is incontestably morally su-
perior, who are we to speak to them of values 
anyway? 
Clearly, then, while it’s not easy to figure out 
what we should do, some things we certainly 
shouldn’t do. For instance, we need to stop em-
phasizing gender equality. We’ve only recently 
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converted to this ourselves and are now its chief 
proselytizers. Yet the more vociferously we beat 
the drum for muslim women’s liberation, the 
more we cause nativists to oppose us because 
they can’t countenance the atomization of fam-
ilies and society to which our version of equal-
ity all too plainly leads, and because what we 
promote contravenes Quranic common sense 
as well as law. moreover, to threaten people’s 
core moral sensibilities—especially when these 
involve things so critical as sexual and social 
reproduction—is to threaten their identity and 
therefore ensure a violent response. Consider, 
too, that while in theory it might seem that lib-
erated muslim women will raise tolerant, pro-
Western muslim sons, what will happen when 
those sons find themselves pitted against nativ-
ist parents and their sons? Who will fight, and 
who will win? The answers are all too clear.
Our Options
our solipsism—we honestly want everyone to be able to live just like us—causes un-
told problems, as does our generosity, which is 
the flip side of assuming everyone is like us (but 
they just don’t realize it yet). For instance, to 
return to the subject of superiority, our attitudes 
about ourselves are quite imperial: Virtually all 
great powers have been driven by confidence in 
their technological, military and moral superi-
ority. Yet our behavior toward others is not the 
least bit imperial: We are not comfortable swal-
lowing extant peoples; we no longer engage in 
conquest; we want people to remain “free”; we 
are uncomfortable treating others as inferior. 
our ideals tell us to be inclusive and egalitar-
ian. Consequently, we assimilate individuals 
from absolutely anywhere—as long as they 
adopt our values.
But this is also how we appear schizophren-
ic, wedded as we are to egalitarian ideals, yet 
committed to staying on top in order to ensure 
that these ideals—and our freedoms—stay se-
cure. This means we ourselves can’t be con-
sidered moderate when it comes to protecting 
American power or our way of life. Although 
our roots are as a Promised Land rather than 
a Crusader state, in the felicitous phrasing 
of Walter macDougall’s 1997 book, at this 
point in time our version of global capitalism 
has locked us into a continual search for new 
markets, both for cheaper labor and willing 
buyers. nor can we remain ourselves and not 
export practices we want others to adopt in or-
der that they may become more prosperous. 
in our view, this is how we help people prog-
ress, progress being one of our most cherished 
values. 
This does not mean that our brand of 
Westernization is consciously malign. indeed, 
what we currently push is considerably differ-
ent than the imperialisms of previous cen-
turies, when conquerors inserted themselves 
atop local power structures. Today, we seek 
to reform what we take to be unfair power 
structures, not co-opt or dominate them. 
The problem is, however, that not even this 
seemingly noble motivation is value neutral. 
Rather, whenever we promote wide-ranging 
change, we inadvertently (though sometimes 
purposely) threaten local social relations. To 
those for whom these relations are sources of 
power, we upset the apple cart. To those for 
whom these relations are sacrosanct, we at-
tack their identity. nativism is one predict-
able consequence of both scenarios.
But if pushing change is unwise given the 
second- and third-order effects that can lead 
to anti-Western blowback, then perhaps we 
should focus on toleration and on encourag-
ing more mutual respect instead. Toleration 
clearly works for us, so it is hard not to as-
sume it should work for everyone. There was 
even a time (prior to World War ii) when 
friendship and respect characterized relations 
between middle Easterners and visitors from 
the English-speaking world. Think T. E. 
Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, Freya stark and the 
other great orientalists Edward said was so 
fond of disparaging. But no more. Even prior 
to the rise of terrorism, few American tourists 
ventured to the middle East (outside of israel 
and Christian religious sites) to see anything 
other than ruins. Westerners flock to india to 
sit at the feet of gurus; Buddhism continues 
to attract lifelong devotees; new Agers have 
made a fetish of native American spiritual-
ism. But few Americans have manifested in 
recent decades anything approaching deep 
respect for islam’s intrinsic worth. This can 
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only reinforce islamists’ long-standing con-
viction that we do not take them or their re-
ligion seriously. The fact that we express no 
admiration, let alone interest except in the 
wake of terror and violence, sends all sorts of 
signals and surely serves as yet another moti-
vation for islamist youth (especially) to prove 
us wrong.
There is, of course, another reason to 
mention aesthetics in relation to respect. 
Through the ages, rulers who sought to 
create great works by which to boost their 
prestige and enhance their reputation gath-
ered together the most skilled artisans and 
craftsmen they could find, regardless of their 
communal affiliations. Appreciation of oth-
ers’ artistic talents has long been a stepping-
stone to tolerance. But kings, queens, caliphs, 
emperors and others usually guaranteed this 
only by carefully balancing different factions 
and communities. in the United states, we 
discovered an alternative to benign autoc-
racy. in America, institutionalized checks 
guarantee individual liberty. We could say 
that while empires were comprised of groups 
out of which individuals (great painters, mu-
sicians and builders) could emerge, we con-
sist of individuals from among whom groups 
can form. The loci of control are completely 
different. 
But peering beneath the surface, so too is 
what is tolerated. For instance, for all the tolera-
tion we claim to manifest, and for all our laud-
ing of multiculturalism and pluralism (some-
thing empires like the ottoman and Habsburg 
really did protect), there are at least two things 
we not only cannot, but will not, tolerate. one is 
communal solidarities or attachments that take 
precedence over the primacy of individuals; the 
second is domination by a single denomination. 
Because we cannot reconcile ourselves to either 
of these, a fundamental incompatibility does 
exist between us and the world of islam, not 
just between us and violent islamists. ironically, 
our liberty only exacerbates this incompatibil-
ity, especially if isaiah Berlin was correct that 
individuals must have secure cultural belonging 
if they are to be genuinely free.
i raise this because the salience of communal or corporate identity versus individualism 
has been spinning societies and cultures along 
different trajectories for centuries. Despite 
optimism about modernization that once led 
social scientists to predict the withering away 
of communal attachments, it should now be 
clear that liberal concepts work only among 
those willing to question their identity and 
religion—that is, people who already regard 
themselves as independent agents. our ideas, 
therefore, can erode beliefs only among those 
who do not want to draw their primary iden-
tity from the group, or do not feel they owe the 
group their allegiance. 
such independent agents have existed in 
every society, so our ideas have always won 
some allies within the world of islam and al-
ways will. But then there is factionalization: 
The more independent Westernized agents 
there are, and the more such people openly 
question or even ridicule tradition, the more 
this produces and strengthens nativists. Re-
member, entire societies never Westernize or 
modernize without tremendous force being 
applied from on high by fiat, or from without. 
most societies have to face catastrophe before 
they’ll voluntarily give up what’s most essen-
tial to their identity. ironically, this surrender 
is all the less likely in democratic configura-
tions, where recalcitrance is that much easier 
to keep alive politically.
nevertheless, because we see some inde-
pendent agents embracing our values in all 
societies, it is easy to convince ourselves that 
with just a bit more urging—with stickier 
messages and the right format, or greater 
investment and economic opportunity—we 
can push people over the tipping point to our 
way of doing things. But again, the reality is 
that the very same things we use to attract 
likewise repel. Worse, when nativists belong 
to one of the world’s great religions, religion 
Corporate identity versus 
individualism has been spin-
ning societies in different 
directions for centuries.
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offers them a global community. it may not 
be a community that really holds together, 
but so long as small constituent groups think 
it might, or believe it should, they will re-
tain their sense of purpose and strive to make 
others feel it, too, through spectacular acts of 
devotion. 
There is at least one other thing that a re-
ligion—in theory—can also enable. Peoples 
who share the same religion may take on 
the characteristics of a nation over time. We 
could say that this is what muhammad wove 
together for the Arabs, who, prior to islam, 
shared a language and modes of livelihood 
but little else. muhammad and the early ca-
liphs emphasized the umma, a concept that, if 
wielded skillfully, could prove more overarch-
ing than “the Arabs” or any other collectiv-
ity yet known. How inclusive has the umma 
proved? if we go back just a century, we don’t 
find a pan-islamic community of believers; 
the umma was not united in World War i or 
during World War ii. or take what is occur-
ring in Darfur or iraq today. Divisions persist. 
some are tribal; others by now are national. 
it’s not at all clear that shi‘i affiliation, for in-
stance, can trump iraqi or iranian identities. 
it didn’t during the 1980–88 iran-iraq War 
or during the first Gulf War.
in Part one of this essay, i made the case 
that adolescence and factionalization are facts 
of human existence that roil the world—and 
thus deserve more concerted attention than 
they receive. Here the focus has been on reli-
gion, islam in particular. Religion is not some-
thing we mortals can supersede, while islam as 
a specific religion is not one we can contain. 
For these reasons, islam is also not a subject we 
should address directly, counterintuitive as this 
may seem. As soon as we voice our preferences, 
or praise moderation and moderates, or preach 
toleration, we create problems for those who 
want to work with us. Clearly, we would do bet-
ter instead to encourage dissent over anything 
but religion. But what, in that case, should we 
appeal to instead?
if religion trumps ideology, ideology is not 
the answer. nor is class. Workers of the world 
never unite sufficiently to cross-cut parochial 
allegiances, no matter how domestically useful 
class politics may be. The fact of parochial in-
terests does, however, raise an intriguing spec-
ter: What about nationalism, religion’s closest 
secular counterpart, and the very thing that 
kept the umma fractured before?
We already know that nationalism works. 
We even know how it works. How ironic, 
then, if the scourge of the last two centuries 
could prove salutary in this one. But also how 
fitting if allegiance to the nation-state—a 
modern, Western invention—turned out to 
be the most effective antidote to anti-West-
ernization. Given the configuration of our 
world, it is hard to imagine what else, apart 
from nationalism, might inspire governments 
to rally their young men and keep them un-
der control. After all, young men are a main 
component of the problem and a cohort that 
governments should be able to do something 
about, government being the most legitimate 
purveyor of force we know—apart, that is, 
from religion. 
if the current diplomacy fails, the most likely chain of events will be a unilateral israeli withdrawal, followed by Hizballah provocations, followed in turn by massive israeli air 
and commando attacks on Hizballah in Lebanon, both in the south and in the Beirut area 
as well. That would probably trigger rocket attacks on israel far deeper into its territory 
than ever before. if these exchanges get out of hand—or if israeli planes are lost to stinger 
rockets—a sizable israeli incursion into Lebanon might follow, and with it a war with 
syria involving missiles of still greater ranges falling onto israeli population centers.
—Adam Garfinkle, “The next middle Eastern War”, American Diplomacy (summer 1998).
